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Malaysia) focusing on their reach beyond conventional trade in goods and services issues. What
emerges is of a picture of ill-defined general commitments and precise undertaking, which vary from
element to element and country pair to country pair. These agreements are recent, but they are
numerous and more are under negotiation. We separately synthesize and evaluate provisions in five
areas: competition policy, investment, mutual recognition, movement of persons, and broader
cooperation.
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1. Introduction 
The recent wave of regional trade and other agreements that have occurred in the 
trading system, and been negotiated outside of WTO structure and process, have been 
noted in a number of recent papers (see, for example, Antkiewicz and Whalley 2004). 
Most of these agreements go substantially beyond conventional free trade agreements in 
dealing with items not yet subject to WTO disciplines and the idea that FTA’s are still 
largely concerned with goods and services is no longer in keeping with contemporary 
realities. They have instead, like multilateral WTO negotiations, become platforms for 
packaging a range of new and ongoing issues previously dealt with separately (such as 
visas / work permits) into a combined negotiation. These issues, however, differ both 
between  multilateral  and  regional  negotiations,  and  across  individual  regional 
negotiations.  
Indeed, the term FTA’s is increasingly being displaced in negotiating circles by 
new  language  (for  example,  the  recent  Singapore-Japan  agreement  is  a  “New  Age 
Economic Partnership”). Many of the recent regional agreements have long and complex 
texts, are relatively recent (last 2-3 years), with some scheduled for implementation over 
a period of 5-years stretching out around to 2010. More are under negotiation and the 
significance of regional agreements in the system will likely to grow. 
The number and complexity of these agreements makes synthesizing their main 
features and understanding their implications for the trading system a non-trivial task. 
Here we discuss a subset of recent agreements both involving ASEAN as a single entity, 
and also those individual ASEAN countries negotiating separately as individual countries 
(Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). ASEAN at this point has concluded three formal   3 
framework  agreements  (with  China,  Japan,  and  India)  aiming  to  lead  to  move  more 
substantive arrangements and has a further 2 (with Korea, and Australia & New Zealand 
jointly) under negotiation. Singapore has concluded 6 substantive agreements (with the 
US, EFTA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Jordan) and is negotiating a further 12. 
Thailand  has  concluded  2  full  agreements  (with  Australia,  Bahrain),  2  framework 
agreements (with the US, India), 1 ancillary agreement to a wider ASEAN agreement 
only  covering  vegetable  and  fruits  (with  China),  and  is  negotiating  a  further  5 
agreements.  Malaysia  has  a  single  bilateral  investment  treaty  with  the  US,  but  is 
negotiating a further 5 agreements.  These agreements vary greatly in length, specificity 
and coverage; some are lengthy and detailed with substantial specificity (especially the 
Singapore-US agreement). 
Beyond  the  length  and  complexity  of  some  of  the  agreements
1,  what  is  also 
striking is the breath of their coverage. Many areas beyond current WTO disciplines are 
dealt  with  including  competition  policy,  mutual  recognition  (both  of  professional 
qualifications and product standards and testing), movement of persons and visa/work 
permit  arrangements,  investment,  and  cooperation  in  specific  areas.  Here  we  both 
summarize and interpret some of these elements and assess their impact. Whether these 
(and also other agreements outside of ASEAN) now represent a leading edge of globally 
negotiated new disciplines which is rapidly developing outside of WTO process is the 
broader issue on which our discussion touches. 
Our assessment is that certainly the attention and detail devoted to these matters 
in pairwise agreements, some of which seemingly cover only relatively small amounts of 
                                                 
1 By way of example, Singapore agreement with EFTA is 69 pages of text and 529 pages of annexes. The 
Singapore-US  agreement  is  240  pages  of  text  with  lengthy  annexes  treated  as  integral  parts  of  the 
agreement.   4 
economic activity, support the notion something of substance has occurred in the areas 
we  cover.  Precedents  for  other  agreements  may  be  involved.  The  content  of  these 
agreements could thus well provide a future focal point for new attempts to deal with 
non-trade issues in subsequent more comprehensive agreement (visa and work permit 
issues is one example). Also, beyond the disciplines themselves, these agreements set in 
place  institutional  mechanisms  outside  of  WTO  process  which  will  likely  become 
increasingly significant for global trade policy management over the next few decades. 
One can reasonably argue that these trade agreements are, for now, only vague 
and general statements of largely diplomatic significance, and also perhaps a response to 
a negotiating community seeking to achieve promotion both of itself and of individuals 
within negotiating bureaucracies. According to this view, these agreements, despite their 
length, should perhaps be seen as relatively lacking in force and hence symbolic and 
diplomatic rather than providing deeply substantive additions to WTO disciplines. 
The  position  we  argue  in  what  follows  is  that  there  is  substance  in  these 
agreements beyond goods and services (especially given slow progress multilaterally in 
the  WTO),  and  more  attention  should  perhaps  be  given  to  them  by  the  research 
community.
2 But at the same time, it is worth emphasizing that precise evaluation of their 
                                                 
2 The recent literature discussing these agreements is limited and largely focused on the direct trade impacts 
from tariff barrier changes. DeRosa (2004) discuss both the ASEAN and individual country agreements, 
but almost exclusively in terms of their direct trade effects; issues beyond trade in goods and services are 
not centrally addressed. Weintraub(2004) compares the US, Chilean and Singaporean agreements, but once 
again does not touch centrally on the issues discussed here. A recent paper by Aoki (2004) discusses some 
of  these  issues  in  Japan’s  Economic  Partnership  Agreements,  but  does  not  discuss  the  full  range  of 
agreements we discuss here. The volume by Rajan and Sen (2001) and Sen (2004) provides background 
discussion for Singapore and ASEAN agreements, but with again little specificity on the issues addressed 
here. The paper by Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2001) and the volume by Scollay and Gilbert (2001) also 
focus  largely  on  the  trade  dimension  of  these  agreements.  Elek(2003)  provides  a  general  background 
discussion to the trading relationship behind these agreements, but little specificity on the issues touched 
here.    5 
impacts on global trade using analytical techniques of modern trade theory seems to us 
difficult to undertake.  
We first briefly describe the recent regional and country agreements at issue, and 
then discuss their content in more detail for each of five areas beyond goods and services. 
These  areas  are  competition  policy,  mutual  recognition,  movement  of  persons, 
investment, and broader cooperation provisions. In a concluding section, we provide an 
evaluation  both  of  their  significance  in  providing  substantive  new  international 
disciplines and of their potential impact on the evolution of the wider trading system.   6 
2. The Regional Agreements of Both ASEAN and ASEAN Countries 
The trade and wider economic partnership agreements of both ASEAN as a singe 
entity and individual ASEAN countries we discuss here are all relatively recent. ASEAN 
has  concluded  three  agreements  (China  in  2002  with  additional  details  agreed  since; 
Japan in 2003; India in 2003), Singapore has six (New Zealand in 2000, EFTA in 2002, 
Australia and US in 2003, and Japan and Jordan in 2004), Thailand has four (with the US 
and Bahrain in 2002, Australia and India in 2003), and Malaysia has one (the US in 
2004).All these entities are also currently involved in more negotiations.
3 
The agreements concluded thus far vary in coverage, specificity, and length. By 
way of example, the present US-Thai agreement is a framework agreement which acts as 
a precursor to a more substantial agreement and is a few pages and only establishes a 
joint consultative mechanism for future discussions and eventual negotiation. The US-
Malaysia agreement is similar in form, but restricted to investment. In contrast, the US-
Singapore agreement is 240 pages of text with lengthy annexes treated as integral parts of 
the  agreement,  and  has  21  chapters.  It  covers  trade  in  substantial  detail,  including  a 
separate chapter on trade in textiles and apparel dealing with origin and transshipment. It 
also covers competition policy, mutual recognition in both services chapters, and chapters 
on movement of persons, investment, and many other issues. As the first of two of a 
recent wave of US bilateral agreements (along with Chile) (see Weintraub 2004) it had 
                                                 
3 Singapore is negotiating a  further 12 agreements  with:  Canada, Egypt, India, Korea, Mexico,  Chile, 
Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. Thailand is negotiating 5 with: Japan, China, Peru, 
New Zealand, and BIMSTEC. Malaysia is negotiating 5 with: Japan, New Zealand, Australia, India, and 
Korea. ASEAN is negotiating a further 2 arrangements with: Republic of Korea, and Australia & New 
Zealand.  
   7 
significance as a precedent for subsequent regional negotiations for US groups with a 
wider interest in evolving US trade regime. 
These  agreements  also  differ  substantially  in  coverage.  The  Thai-Bahrain 
agreement is a comprehensive trade agreement in its coverage of goods and services, but 
is largely restricted to this. The Singapore-Japan agreement, in contrast, is labeled a New 
Age Economic Partnership and has extremely broad coverage. 
These agreements seemingly fulfill several roles. First, they allow for execution 
of customized and niche country (region) to country negotiations which differ case by 
case (unlike WTO agreements). This allows pairwise for countries to negotiate only on 
issues  they  jointly  choose,  and  in  ways  they  jointly  select  and  so  the  form  of  each 
agreement pairwise differs. But they also provide for the development of country (region) 
to country relationships by establishing permanent and ongoing consultative and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. They also provide a forum into which discussions on existing 
non-trade issues can be brought for more comprehensive country to country negotiations 
(such as visas and work permit issues). They almost certainly respond to both political 
and bureaucratic internal demands within countries for negotiations which yield concrete 
agreements  for  public  display,  with  resultant  opportunities  for  advancement  within 
negotiating  bureaucracies.  But  at  the  same  time,  they  are  substantive  since they  also 
touch on a range of issues not yet covered by WTO disciplines, and hence potentially 
allow countries the opportunity to shape any subsequent multilateral disciplines through 
prior regional negotiations. 
Some of the language in these agreements is vague and imprecise, and hence 
difficult to firmly evaluate, but in some areas the agreements are very explicit even with   8 
numerical targets specified for particular agreements. They have been little studied by the 
research community, because they are recent, diverse, and hard to quantify in terms of 
impact, but their potential significance for the evolution of the trading system, to us at 
least, seems not to be beyond doubt. 
Table  1  lists  these  agreements.  Singapore  has  been  the  most  active  of  the 
negotiating  entities  involved,  and  also  has  generated  the  most  complex  and 
comprehensive  of  the  resulting  agreements.  Singaporean  policy  is  also  now  oriented 
towards the development of a network of negotiated economic relationships which seek 
to develop government to government partnership agreements well beyond the goods and 
services type agreements in the WTO and earlier FTA’s and with many trading entities. 
Other ASEAN countries seem to be following the Singaporean lead with new country 
negotiations  under  way,  although  there  is  some  debate  as  to  whether  other  ASEAN 
countries will be able to move as quickly or as comprehensively as Singapore.  Thailand 
is the country who has most comprehensively followed the Singaporean path, although 
the Philippines has a negotiation under way with Japan.   9 
Table 1 
Recent Trade and Economic Partnership Agreements of ASEAN  




China-ASEAN  Signed  4  Nov  4  2002-Framework  Agreement  for  Subsequent  China-                                          
          ASEAN FTA to follow 10 years.   
India – ASEAN Signed 8 Oct 2003 – Framework  Agreement  for  Subsequent  ASEAN-
          India Comprehensive Economic Partnership  
          Agreement 
Japan – ASEAN Signed 8 Oct 2003 –Framework Agreement for future ASEAN-  
          Japan  Comprehensive  Economic  Partnership 
          Agreement 
Singapore: 
 
Singapore – New Zealand Signed 18 Aug 2000-Closer Economic Partnership –  
            Enhanced FTA 
Singapore – EFTA Signed 11 April 2002 -  Enhanced FTA 
Singapore – Australia Signed 17 Feb 2003  - Enhanced FTA going beyond New Zealand 
            agreement 
Singapore – US Signed 6 May 2003 -  Complex enhanced FTA 
Singapore – Japan Signed 13 January 2004 - New Age Economic Partnership going well 
            beyond conventional FTA in many areas 
Singapore – Jordan Signed 16 May 2004-  Conventional FTA largely covering goods 
            and services 
Thailand: 
 
US – Thailand Signed  23 Oct 2002-   Short  Trade  and  Investment  Framework 
            Agreement to initiate FTA negotiations 
Bahrain – Thailand Signed 29 Dec 2002-  FTA covering goods and services 
Australia – Thailand Signed 5 July 2003-  Extended FTA with broad coverage beyond 
            goods and service trade 
India – Thailand Signed 9 Oct 2003 –  Framework  Agreement  for  creating  Free 
            Trade Area between India and Thailand  
Malaysia: 
Malaysia – US Signed 10 May 2004 –   Brief  Investment  Agreement  establishing 
            joint consultation 
   10 
3. Competition Policy 
The first of the areas beyond goods and services dealt with in the ASEAN and 
country agreements that we discuss is competition policy. The term competition policy 
captures  laws  and  regulations  that  pertain  to  market  conduct  (abuse  of  market 
dominance),  rights  of  entry,  mergers  and  acquisitions,  agreements  between  firms 
(including collusion behaviour) and abuse of market dominance, predatory conduct and 
other  matters.    Competition  policies  vary  around  the  world  involving  both  defined 
standards  of  conduct  and  performance  with  agencies  to  oversee  these  standards,  and 
arrangements which grant firms rights to pursue civil actions. Many countries outside the 
OECD still have no competition laws.  These policies are usually thought of as designed 
with an eye primarily to efficiency considerations (as currently in the US), but in some 
parts of the world (as in the EU) equity considerations also enter. 
Of the ASEAN blocwide and regional agreements listed in Table 1, six of these 
contain  provisions  relating  to  competition  policy;  Singapore-US,  Singapore-EFTA, 
Singapore-New Zealand, Singapore - Australia, Singapore-Japan, and Thailand-Australia. 
The two ASEAN agreements (with China and India) have no coverage of competition 
policy. Singapore at the time of negotiation had no formal competition law, but is now in 
the process of enacting such laws. 
The ways in which competition policy is dealt within these agreements varies 
from case to case. The most detailed treatment occurs in the Singapore-US agreement, 
and is set out in a 8 page chapter (12) not titled competition policy but instead “Anti 
Competitive Business Conduct, Designated Monopolies and Government Enterprises”. 
This chapter commingles broad statements of principles on matters related to competition   11 
policy  and  detailed  and  specific  commitments  by  the  two  parties  on  a  range  of 
competition related matters. Article 12.2 commits the two parties to adopt or maintain 
measures  to  limit  anti  competitive  business  conduct  in  their  jurisdiction,  and  to  each 
establish or maintain an authority within their countries to enforce such measures. No 
detailed list or elaboration of measures is given. 
Article  12.3  goes  on  to  define  “designated  monopolies”  and  “government 
enterprises”,  and  specific  commitments  by  each  party  with  respect  to  each  category 
follow. The government of Singapore, for instance, undertakes to act solely on the basis 
of commercial considerations in purchases and sales of  goods and services involving 
government  enterprises;  not  to  enter  into  exclusionary  or  competition  restraining 
practices with competitors, not to use voting rights to influence decisions of government 
enterprises in non commercial ways, and to have as a goal to eventually eliminate such 
aggregate  ownership  as  confers  effective  influence  over  such  entities.  Singapore  also 
commits  to  a  detailed  consolidated  annual  report  for  such  entities  identifying  the 
percentage of shares owned by the government, a description of special shares or voting 
rights, the name and title of any government official serving as an officer, and annual 
revenues and/or assets. But the scope of the article is restricted in various ways. Price 
discrimination as a business practice, for example, is explicitly not covered by the article 
(and it is so stated), and nor are government procurement policies. 
Articles 12.4 and 12.5 deal with cooperation and transparency, and parties commit 
to cooperate and make publicly available information requested of each other regarding 
such  entities,  relating  to  their  business  conduct  considerations  in  their  jurisdiction. 
Articles 12.6 and 12.7 set out consultation and dispute mechanisms. Article 12.8 then   12 
proceeds to areas of definition. Covered entities are defined to include entities under 
Singaporean laws in which the Government of Singapore owns special voting shares with 
veto rights with regard to a series of matters but excludes both government enterprises 
investing the reserves of the Singapore government in foreign markets, and Temasek 
Holdings (Pvt) Ltd, a holding company for government enterprises. Article 12.8 also sets 
out a definition of “effective influence” whereby  the  government and its government 
enterprises alone or in combination own more than 50% of an entity or have the ability to 
exercise substantial influence over the composition of the board of directors (or managing 
body). An annex (12A) sets out a flow chart providing an example of how effective 
influence may be interpreted in the implementation of the agreement. 
The other agreements cover competition in less detail, but with some variation. 
The  Thai-Australia  agreement  commits  both  governments  to  actually  apply  their 
competition laws, but allows measures or sectors to be exempt from the commitment on 
public  interest  grounds  if  done  on  a  transparent  way.  There  are  then  (undetailed) 
commitments to cooperate and exchange information, to consult, and to make publicly 
available their respective competition laws. 
The Singapore-Australia agreement is similar but goes further. Parties commit to 
promote fair competition, and to curtail four types of anti competitive practice. These are 
anti-competitive horizontal arrangements between competitors; misuse of market power, 
including predatory pricing by business; anti competitive vertical arrangements between 
businesses; and anti competitive mergers and acquisitions. They also agree to promote 
competition,  and  to  apply  their  competition  laws  under  a  principle  of  “competitive 
neutrality”  under  which  no  competitive  advantage  is  to  accrue  to  government  and   13 
business  because  they  are  government  owned.  A  statement  of  allowable  exemptions 
(similar  to  the  content  of  the  Thai-  Australia  agreement)  follows,  along  with 
commitments to consultation, review and transparency. 
The Singapore-EFTA agreement is even shorter, comprising 11 lines of text (in 
chapter 10). Parties accept that anti competitive practices can impact on trade, and agree 
upon request to enter into consultation and provide information which is confidential to 
business interests. The parties then have recourse to arbitration under this chapter. 
The  Singapore-  New  Zealand  agreement  is  even  shorter  than  the  Singapore- 
EFTA agreement with five lines of text in Article 24. The joint commitment is that both 
parties will ensure that where specific commitments are made relating to market access 
and national treatment for goods and services that they are not adversely affected by 
actions of a monopoly supplier. 
The Singapore- Japan agreement is a little longer with 3 articles, but is still brief. 
It  states  that  each  country  is  free  to  use  its  own  competition  laws.  It  then states  the 
willingness of the two governments to cooperate in controlling anti competitive practices, 
without  providing  details  of  the  cooperation.  It  then  indicates  that  dispute  settlement 
arrangements in the wider agreement will not apply to this part of the agreement. 
These  agreements  though  varied  are  not  lacking  in  specificity  as  far  as 
competition law is concerned (especially the Singapore –US agreement) and they also 
need to be seen alongside other efforts to generate systems of international disciplines 
over domestic competition laws. Perhaps the most far reaching of these are in the EU, 
where  diverse  domestic  laws  of  member  states  have  been  overlaid  with  commonly   14 
accepted European wide statutes with European courts with powers to levy fines and 
other penalties.  
The competition policy  component of these  agreements can also be seen as a 
partial bilateral response to the failure in the WTO to negotiate on competition policy. In 
the WTO these was considerable discussion of competition related issues following the 
1996 Singapore ministerial and prior to the launch of the Doha Round. As Bhattacharjea 
(2004)  identifies,  the  directions  proposed  for  a  multilateral  agreement  in  competition 
policies  in  these  discussions  included  achieving  investment  promoting  benefits  of 
harmonized competition policies; actions against anti competitive practices that restrict 
market access for imports; replacement of anti-dumping arrangements by competition 
policies (as in the EU); and restrictions on cross border cartels. In the 2001 agreement to 
launch the round only part of this list survived, and this remaining part was then dropped 
at the 2004 Cancun ministerial (see Bhattacharjea 2004). 
Relative  to  these  efforts,  what  is  both  sought  and  achieved  in  these  country 
agreements is more modest. Harmonization of competition policy is not accepted as a 
goal, but weakening the trade effects both of competition policies and anti competitive 
practices do represent a clear objective. There is no uniform approach, sharp differences 
also occur in the specificity and precision of some agreements (Singapore-US) relative to 
the generality of others.  But there is substance in the provisions in this area.   15 
4. Investment Provisions 
Investment is dealt with in more of the country agreements than is competition 
policy and is also covered in the ASEAN agreements. There is also more commonality in 
approach, with central commitments being (either or both) National Treatment and MFN 
treatment for foreign investors (typically) alongside provisions relating to expropriation, 
compensation, and (in some cases) repatriation of earnings. 
The ASEAN agreements deal with investment briefly and only in generalities. 
The ASEAN – Japan and ASEAN – India agreements are virtually the same and contain 
general commitments to create a liberal and competitive environment for investment, to 
strengthen cooperation in investment, improve transparency of laws and regulations, and 
to protect investors. The ASEAN-China agreement has similar general provisions, but the 
language differs. 
Among the Thai agreements, the Thai-US agreement is brief in stating agreement 
to enter consultations with a view to negotiations between the parties, but both trade and 
investment are mentioned. The bilateral Thai-India agreement reiterates the content of 
ASEAN – India agreement. The Thai – Bahrain agreement commits parties to create 
favourable conditions for investors and to collaborate through joint ventures. 
The Thai-Australia agreement is more comprehensive with 11 pages of text in its 
investment  chapter.  It  begins  with  definitions  but  then  centers  its  liberalization 
commitments  on  most  favoured  nation  treatment  for  investors,  with  separate  “pre-
establishment”  and  “post-establishment”  national  treatment  provisions.
4  There  is  then 
                                                 
4 The rationale for these two separate commitments as against a single national treatment commitment is 
not clear to the present authors.    16 
language relating to the promotion and protection of investments, and provisions relating 
to expropriation and compensation for losses as well as access to dispute settlement. 
Among the Singaporean agreements, the US-Singapore agreement is lengthier and 
more detailed (31 pages in the investment chapter), but follows a similar flow to the Thai-
Australian agreement above.  It has both national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment  for  investors  of  the  other  party  as  central  commitments.    There  is  then  an 
agreed minimum standard of treatment as fair and equitable treatment under customary 
international law, but with little specificity as to terms. It then proceeds to provisions 
regarding expropriation and compensation. It commits parties to freely allow transfers 
related  to  investments.  It  jointly  removes  all  performance  requirements  relating  to 
investment  regulation,  and  finally  commits  that  senior  management  of  a  covered 
investment can be of any nationality. It concludes with Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
procedures. 
The Singapore-EFTA agreement has 7 pages of text in its investment chapter and 
covers similar matters using more general language. Most favoured nation and national 
treatment stand as central commitments. There is an article on taxation, applying national 
treatment and most favoured nation treatment also to taxation of investment. Provisions 
on expropriation and compensation follow with an article permitting domestic regulation 
of  investment  on  safety,  health,  or  environmental  grounds.  Articles  on  transfers  and 
mobility of personnel follow. 
The Singapore –Australia agreement has 12 pages in its chapter on investment. 
This differs from the others agreements in only having national treatment (not also most   17 
favoured nation) as the central commitment.
5 Further departures from other agreements 
include a specific chapter on transitional provisions on regional government measures, 
and safeguard escape provisions for movement of persons commitments for balance of 
payments purposes explicitly set out in the investment chapter. 
The Singapore-Japan agreement is lengthier and more detailed. It takes national 
treatment as the central commitment. It prohibits performance requirements, and covers 
expropriation and compensation. It has an article on the repurchase of leases.  It then 
covers transfer and dispute settlement. The Singapore-New Zealand agreement has five 
pages  of  text  covering  both  most  favoured  nation  and  national  treatment  as  joint 
commitments, and an article on repatriation and convertibility. Finally the Malaysian – 
US agreement is a brief 2 page document with a commitment to consult and eventually 
negotiate in the investment area. 
These agreements show much more commonality of approach on investment than 
is case of competition policy. There are substantive commitments, and interestingly of 
relatively  similar  form  to  those  proposed  for  the  failed  Multilateral  Agreement  on 
Investment. In this area, regional negotiations clearly seem to be fulfilling the role of a 
partial substitute for a wider multilateral agreement between countries who were not (in 
the  main)  forces  of  resistance  to  an  agreement  on  multilateral  disciplines  eventually 
emerging from the WTO.   
                                                 
5 Since no border is involved with customs clearance with investment flows (unlike goods), it would seem 
that all that is required is national treatment (a commitment that foreign and domestic investors receive 
equal treatment). This raises the issue of why other agreements contain two (National Treatment and MFN) 
commitments, rather than one.   18 
5. Mutual Recognition 
The coverage of issues related to mutual recognition in the agreements listed in 
Table 1 lies in a number of chapter headings in the various texts. Issues of product testing 
and product standards arise in chapters on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and 
phytosanitary  restrictions,  and  particular  sectoral  chapters,  such  as  on 
telecommunications touch on product standards, while chapters on services deal with 
recognition  of  professional  certification.  This  treatment  of  mutual  recognition  differs 
substantially from the explicit country pairwise treaties on mutual recognition that have 
been negotiated in recent years. These typically involve both mutual agreement to accept 
agreed competent authorities for the mutual determination of standards, and agreements 
on the mutual recognition of more narrowly specified items (such as notorial attestations, 
or certificates).  
The  US-Singapore  agreement  contains  several  mutual  recognition  elements. 
Chapter  6  indicates  steps  to  implement  Phase  I  and  Phase  II  of  the  APEC  Mutual 
Recognition Agreement for conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment. 
Chapter 6 also establishes a working group on medical products providing a forum for 
bilateral cooperation on product regulation issues of mutual interest. 
Chapter  8  on  services  covers  both  domestic  regulation  of  qualification 
requirements and procedures and technical standards and licensing, requiring that these 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to services trade. It then moves on to the issue of 
recognition, indicating that recognition of education or experience obtained, or licenses 
or certificates, may be achieved by harmonization and provides general principle as to 
how such harmonization may be negotiated. An annex to the chapter sets out more detail   19 
on how professional standards should develop on a mutually acceptable basis in more 
detail. 
Recognition  issues  also  arise  in  chapter  12  which  covers  Temporary  Entry  of 
Business Persons. Section IV relating to short term entry arrangements for professionals 
commits each party to grant entry to professionals in categories entered in an Appendix, 
provided that the persons involved possess appropriate credentials. The appendix then 
lists two professions (disaster relief claims adjusters and management consultants) and 
sets out the maximum educational requirements and credentials for each. 
The  Singapore-Japan  agreement,  in  contrast,  contains  a  separate  chapter  on 
mutual recognition, which effectively takes the form of a bilateral mutual recognition 
treaty but now located in a wider economic partnership agreement. The chapter discusses 
the designation of conformity assessment bodies and conformity assessment procedures 
for  products  and  processes  and  provides  definitions.  Parities  are  to  ensure  that  the 
designating authorities have powers to designate, monitor, and to change designations of 
bodies, and then proceeds to articles detailing verification and monitoring of conformity 
assessment bodies. The chapter establishes a joint committee on mutual recognition as 
the institutional structure, with procedures for the registration of conformity assessment 
bodies. The agreement also contains an Article on mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications  in  the  chapter  on  movement  of  natural  persons,  and  establishes  a  joint 
committee on such mutual recognition. 
None  of  the  ASEAN  agreements  touches  on  mutual  recognition  issues,  and 
among the Thai agreements only the Australian agreement does. In separate chapters on 
industrial technical barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures and food   20 
standards, there are articles on harmonization and equivalence of industrial standards, and 
conformity assessment procedures. The chapter on sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and food standards establishes a bilateral consultative forum on these matters. 
The Singapore-Australia agreement, in contrast to the others, explicitly states as 
its  objective  to  build  on  the  preexisting  mutual  recognition  agreement  on  conformity 
assessment between Australia and Singapore. In its chapter on technical regulations and 
sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  it  sets  out  scope  and  obligations  and  states 
harmonization to be the objective. It sets equivalence of mandatory requirements as a 
goal, and lists a series of cooperative activities on sanitary and phytosanitary /quarantine 
matters.  These  include  conformity  assessment  and  exchanges  of  information  and 
consultation. 
The  Singapore-New-Zealand  agreement  also  has  broad  coverage  of  mutual 
recognition  in  its  chapter  on  technical,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  regulations  and 
standards. It begins by defining both mutual recognition and unilateral recognition, and 
establishes a work programme, including in the specific area of electrical and electronic 
equipment.  It  then  has  chapters  on  mutual  recognition  of  equivalence  of  mandatory 
requirements,  mutual  recognition  of  conformity  assessment,  mutual  recognition  of 
equivalence of standards, and exchange of information. 
Beyond  competition  policy  and  investment,  these  agreements  thus  also  touch 
centrally on issues related to mutual recognition. It some cases (Singapore-Japan) they 
allow for what is in effect a comprehensive mutual recognition treaty to be embedded in 
the wider economic (or trade) agreement.  In other cases (Thai-Australia) they extend 
existing mutual recognition agreements. In others (Singapore-US) they set out detailed   21 
commitments  in  a  number  of  areas  which  implies  concrete  mutual  recognition 
commitment.        22 
6. Movement of Persons 
The ASEAN blocwide and country agreements also deal with issues related to 
movement of persons, usually in separate chapters. This is reflective both of the growing 
significance of visa and work permit issues in the global economy and the absence of 
multilateral  venues  for  dealing  with  them  (see  Ng  and  Whalley  2004).
6  In this  case, 
country or regional agreements provide the platform for adding an issue under current 
discussion, but with no clear multilateral forum for discussion. Bargaining across issues 
and with it, the greater probability of achieving results presumably provides the rationale 
for this. 
The  Singapore-US  agreement  has  a  separate  chapter  on  movement  of  persons 
(chapter 11) with 11 pages of text and annexes devoted to this issue. Interestingly, it 
begins  with  a  broad  statement  that  the  preferential  trading  relationship  between  the 
parties implies a mutual desire to facilitate comparable temporary entry with transparent 
criteria and procedures. It then proceeds to a general obligation to apply measures in the 
area so as to avoid adverse impacts or delays involving trade in goods and services or the 
conduct  of  investment  activities  under  the  agreement.  There  are  then  provisions  on 
information exchange, transparency criteria and an agreement to appoint temporary entry 
coordinators in each country. 
The detailed substance in the chapter occurs in an annex (11A) which sets out 
details  of  arrangements  under  four  section  headings;  business  visitors,  traders  and 
investors, intra-company transfers, and professionals. In some cases, (such as business 
visitors) it sets out required documentation for entry. In other (professionals) there are 
                                                 
6 Also, see Nielson (2002) for a recent discussion of temporary  movement of persons in other recent 
bilateral agreements.   23 
appendices which set out numerical target for initial applications for entry of business 
persons from Singapore that US shall annually approve (5,400). These also specify a 
number of considerations required by US immigration laws can that the US shall not take 
into  account  when  making  entry  visas.  These  are  specific  detailed  concessions  to 
Singapore on these matters. 
Movement  of  persons  is  also  dealt  with  in  other  agreements,  but  in  more 
generality  and  less  specificity.  The  Singapore-Australia  agreement  is  limited  to 
movement of business persons, with detailed definition, of key terms including “business 
visitors”, “immigration formality”, “intra-corporate transfers”, “service sellers”, “short 
term  service  sellers”  and  “temporary  entry”.  There  are  then  explicit  commitments  to 
facilitate both “short term temporary entry” and “long term temporary entry”, information 
exchange, and dispute settlement. 
The Thai-Australia agreement is similar, but definitions and terms vary slightly. 
“Contractual services supplier” is defined, but does not appear in the Singapore-Australia 
agreement,  for  instance.  Commitments  on  short  term  temporary  entry  and  long  term 
temporary entry are also the central commitments here. 
In contrast, the Singapore-EFTA agreement is more limited in scope. There is no 
chapter  explicitly  on  movement  of  persons,  but  in  the  investment  chapter  of  the 
agreement there is an article (45) granting entry to investors and key personnel involved 
with investments. The Singapore-New Zealand agreement, equally, has no chapter on 
movement of persons, but it does have separate article with this title in part 11 on General 
Provisions.  This  involves  a  general  undertaking  by  parties  not  to  apply  measures 
restricting movement, and indicates that the parties may subsequently negotiate specific   24 
commitments. The Singapore-Japan agreement does contain a separate chapter (9) on 
movement of persons. There are specific commitments set out in an Annex for short term 
visitors  and  intra  corporate  transfers.  There  are  then  both  provisions  on  and  a  joint 
committee  devoted  to  mutual  recognition  of  profession  qualifications.  Neither  the 
ASEAN  nor  the  shorter  framework  agreements  contain  provisions  relating  to  the 
movement of persons. 
That there is content in these agreements also in the area of movement of persons 
seems  clear,  although  both  the  approach  and  the  specifics  vary  case  by  case.  Here, 
seemingly, the presence of the platform provided by a wide ranging trade and economic 
partnership  agreement  facilitates  visa  and  work  permits  issues  being  included  in  the 
negotiations. But, the diversity of both outcome and approaches makes the emergence of 
later common disciplines from these agreements that much more difficult to envisage.   25 
7. Broader Economic Cooperation 
In addition to the specific areas of coverage set out above, these agreements also 
contain  a  range  of  commitments  relating  to  cooperation  in  a  number  of  areas. 
Cooperation  agreements  are  typically  vague  in  statement,  and  it  is  often  tempting  to 
dismiss them as lacking in substance. But they do represent a commitment to a deepening 
of bilateral relationships and do so in specific and designated areas and hence are of 
substance from a process point of view. The stress on cooperation in the China-ASEAN 
agreement is also manifest in the title of the agreement as a “Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive  Economic  Cooperation”  indicating  the  significance  attached  to 
cooperation in bilateral relationship building in this case. 
The  widest  ranging  cooperation  commitments  occur  in  the  ASEAN-China 
agreement.  There  are  commitments  to  strengthen  cooperation  in  5  key  sectors 
(agriculture, information and communication technology, human resource development, 
investment,  and  Mekong  River  basin  development).  Concrete  measures  to  strengthen 
cooperation  are  to  be  worked  out  in  such  areas  as  standards  through  conformity 
assessment,  technical  barriers  to  trade,  customs  cooperation,  promotion  of  electronic 
commerce, and technology transfers. 
The  ASEAN  agreement  with  Japan  and  India  also  details  many  areas  of 
cooperation including trade facilitation, business environment, energy, information and 
communications  technology,  human  resource  development,  tourism  and  hospitality, 
transportation and logistics, and standards conformity and mutual recognition. Nether the 
Singapore  nor  Thai  more  detailed  agreements,  nor  the  shorter  Thai  framework   26 
agreements  contain  cooperation  agreements,  with  the  exception  that  the  Thai-India 
agreement contains language similar to that in the Thai-ASEAN agreement. 
Though inevitably vague and hard to interpret  as legal text, these cooperation 
elements  in  these  agreements  play  a  role  as  process  in  the  deepening  of  country  to 
country relationships. For countries where sequential relationship building and deepening 
is  seen  as  a  critical  way  to  proceed  in  international  negotiations,  the  cooperation 
provisions of these agreements can play a major role as process as far as international 
economic management is concerned. Commitments to cooperate, even if ill defined, are 
part of process and these new partnership agreements unlike traditional tariff based trade 
agreements  are  not  typically  negotiated  typically  as  one  off  treaty  arrangements  by 
countries with an exclusive focus on legal provisions and detailed text. There are also 
symbolic trust building arrangements, involving symbolic and relationship reinforcing 
exchange.   27 
8. The Implications for the Wider Trading System 
Our paper discusses the broad, diverse, and in some cases concrete commitments 
which are manifest in recent regional agreements involving both ASEAN as a bloc and 
individual ASEAN countries in a range of areas beyond WTO disciplines. Given that 
more of these agreements are under negotiation and agreements outside of the ASEAN 
are  also  growing  rapidly  in  number  and  form,  it  seems  worthwhile  to  make  some 
comments on what we see as the implications for the wider trading system. This is still 
today, despite difficulties in the WTO, seen as centrally a multilateral rule based regime 
to which regional WTO plus type arrangements are appended. We would not claim that 
the WTO is being replaced regional arrangements, but their number and scope do suggest 
that increasingly the system is one of blended regional and multilateral disciplines. 
The component of these agreements we discuss here involves the emergence of a 
system of disciplines covering non-WTO issues. In some cases where failed negotiation 
occurs at multilateral level (as in investment), these regional negotiations seem to be 
partially filling a void. In other cases, the presence of events and importance of the issues 
((movement of persons) is producing a different response pairwise. While this seems to 
be happening in a somewhat inconsistent manner across the various pairwise cases, these 
agreements can only lay the foundation for an eventual set of uniform disciplines that can 
be multilateralized with some difficulty.  
The role that the bilateral trade or partnership agreement in each case plays seems 
to vary from case to case. Competition policy and investment negotiations both partially 
fill voids left by failed multilateral negotiations. Mutual recognition negotiations allow 
existing agreements to be elaborated on in a broader bargain with linkage to other issues.   28 
Movement of persons allows for the platform of a wider economic partnership agreement 
to be used to bring ongoing policy discussion into a larger package of negotiation. And 
cooperation  agreements  represent  a  commitment  to  ongoing  process  in  relationship 
building sequential negotiation. 
These agreements also provide the opportunities for bilateral pairs to customize 
their agreement to the bilateral propensity as to how to proceed. The commonly stated 
concern with such agreements is the erosion of multilateral disciplines via a cluster of 
regional agreements and the complexity and administrative difficulties they generate (in 
rules of origin and pairwise dispute settlement for instance). But, if one argues that there 
are gains from bargaining, just as there are gains from trade, then bilateral bargaining free 
of the constraints of multilateral rules which restrict bargaining (as in the WTO) may 
offer more opportunities for mutual gain. The outcomes discussed here, it can be argued, 
in part facilitate this through the coverage of for now non-negotiable multilateral issues. 
Our discussion also seemingly points to the evaluation that just as at multilateral 
level, what are labeled as trade agreements are ever more in reality becoming more than 
conventional tariff based agreements covering only trade in goods and services. Both 
multilaterally  and  regionally,  trade  policy  is  increasingly  linked  to  an  ever  growing 
number of issues and an ever changing structure of wider global economic management. 
This structure may seem opaque, a little chaotic, and hard to evaluate; but the reality 
would seem unavoidable. 
For many  years with the successes of the GATT in the Dillon, Kennedy, and 
Tokyo  Rounds  in  achieving  significant  reductions  in  tariffs  on  manufactures  in  the 
OECD, it was argued both that trade rules should be separated from other policy elements   29 
so as to preserve a liberal trade regime as a key motor for global growth and that the 
GATT  allowed  this.  The  linkage  multilaterally  first  to  intellectual  property  in  the 
Uruguay Round, and then later as proposed to environment, labour standards, and other 
issues  has  thus  been  a  subject  of  much  debate  and  apprehension  from  trade  policy 
practitioners and researchers. 
At regional level we seemingly now have indications of considerably wider and 
more extensive linkage. The fear of contamination of trading arrangements and possible 
increases in trade barriers driven by cross retaliation has in practice to be counterbalanced 
by the potential increase in gains from bargaining by expanding the bargaining set. And 
the practical reality is that all issues are inevitably linked through the political process. 
These  ASEAN  blockwide  and  country  regional  agreements  simply  serve  to 
underscore all these trends. Global trade policy is now inextricably linked to non-trade 
issues; it is somewhat chaotic and (in places) highly non transparent and hard to evaluate 
using analytical models. It is ever more diverse, and difficult at times to synthesize and 
distill.  In  the  areas  we  discuss,  we  would  repeat  our  comment  earlier  that  these 
agreements merit more attention.         30 
9. Conclusions 
We  discuss  recent  bilateral,  regional,  and  country  trade,  partnership,  and 
economic agreements involving both ASEAN as a single entity and individual ASEAN 
countries (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia) focusing on their reach beyond conventional 
trade in goods and services issues. These agreements are recent, but they are numerous 
and more are under negotiation. We separately synthesize and evaluate provisions in five 
areas;  competition  policy,  investment,  mutual  recognition,  movement  of  persons,  and 
broader cooperation.  What emerges is of a picture of ill defined general commitments 
and precise undertaking, which vary from element to element and country pair to country 
pair,  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  presence  of  substance,  which  in  turn, 
seemingly grows in complexity and form in more recent agreements.  
We  suggest  in  concluding  comments  that  though  difficult  to  analyze  through 
analytical  methods  used  by  economists,  their  presence  in  the  trading  system  may  be 
increasingly hard to ignore. A linked WTO and non-WTO (or regional network) of trade 
treaties would seem to define the contemporary world, with difference in coverage and 
treatment between the two.  In this set of agreements, international negotiation founded 
on mutual tariff concessions on goods and later enlarged to services in the GATS seems 
now  to  be  inextricably  linked  to  a  wider  range  of  issues  now  facing  inter-country 
economic management. This reality of the contemporary trading system seems clear in 
what we discuss.     31 
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